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I. INTRODUCTION
There is wide agreement among scholars and journalists that 
budget making in Japan is quite institutionalized, with decisions 
being made almost exclusively through negotiations between the Fi­
nance Ministry and the ministry concerned. Intervention by the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP,the party in power since 1955), it is 
argued, is marginal. While each ministry does try to mobilize the 
support of concerned policy groups within the LDP, and although these 
groups sometimes succeed in wielding influence at the first stage 
of budget making, most LDP Diet members are more interested in at­
taining specific favors for their constituencies and business sup­
porters than in making general policies. In order to please his con­
stituents, every Dietman seeks to get for his election district as 
much funding as possible for highways, railroads, schools and welfare 
facilities. In short, the budget-making process reflects many of the 
characteristics of Japanese politics in general. In his pioneering 
study on Japanese policy-making, Misawa Sigeo wrote:
As the keystone of the policy-making structure, the LDP 
should strike a balance between the Diet and the cabinet­
bureaucracy, but because of its weak and elastic character, 
it fails to function as such. As a result, even after the 
1955 merger (of the two conservative parties), the basis 
of the policy-making structure continues to be bureaucracy... 
A further complication is that the LDP tends to get too 
deeply involved in the minor details of administrative 
proposals which should be left to the bureaucracy. Diet 
members and factions of the LDP try to influence bureau­
crats in an attempt to gain privileges and subsidies for 
their constituents and interest groups, expecting in re­
turn votes and campaign funds; they thus turn the central 
bureaucracy into an agent for expanding party strength.
2Another Japanese scholar, Kawanaka Niko, wrote:
In Japan, administrators are deeply involved in the poli­
tical activities of the government; "professional" admini­
strators recommend policies, see to it that they are adop­
ted, integrate them, and move them forward... Thus, (poli- 
cies) are manipulated behind the doors of ministry offices.
In place of the LDP leadership, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has to 
assume the responsibility for interest aggregation and the setting of 
priorities among the numerous proposals made by the various ministries. 
This explains the preeminent position of the Finance Ministry in Japan­
ese politics.
Two objections can be raised to the above view on Japanese policy- 
making in general, and budget-making in particular. First, many LDP 
Diet members, having assumed administrative responsibilities during 
the long period of one-party domination (over twenty five years), have 
acquired expertise as well as interests in policy questions. They have 
been appointed as ministers, vice-ministers and chairmen of Diet com­
mittees, which provides them experience and, therefore, training.
Their interests in the policy issues of a particular ministry continue 
to be strong even after their appointments have ended. And, as Mur- 
amatsu Michio has pointed out, they have acquired skill in dealing 
with, and manipulating, public officials to make their preferences
3 
prevail. The increasing influence of the LDP in this respect is most 
clearly seen in the active participation of the committees of the LDP 
Policy Affairs Research Council in policy making. The leading posi­
tions in these committees are held mostly by ex-ministers. These 
committees, working through the policy-making structure of the LDP
as well as through informal channels to the bureaucracy and top 
3governmental leaders, wield considerable influence on decision making 
within a ministry and that among the ministries.
Secondly, there are a few issue areas that the top leadership 
of the LDP considers too important to be left to the bureaucracy. 
These issues are usually concerned with ideological issues that could 
provoke severe opposition in the Diet and among the public: internal 
security, defense policy, constitutional revision of the status of 
the Emperor. Macro-budgeting as well as tax increases, although less 
ideological, are included in this category because they are regarded 
as being directly related to the rise and fall of party fortunes. 
The defense budget, if related to a tax increase, is one of the most 
sensitive issues in this respect.
Due to their close daily contacts with constituents, party poli­
ticians usually have a more sensitive understanding of public opinion 
than non-elected public officials. The former are also responsible 
for the smooth functioning of the Diet, whose time schedule is often 
disrupted by opposition parties. Thus, LDP Dietmen are also more 
sensitive to the viewpoints of the opposition than public officials 
are. In addition, top party leaders keep a careful eye on the re­
sults of elections, both national and local, which serve as indica­
tors of changing public opinion. LDP politicians are confident of 
their own assessment of the political climate of the nation. Hence, 
they take the initiative in controversial issues, while leaving tech­
nical issues to the bureaucracy. Without this sensitivity and prag­
matism, the conservative party could not have maintained its power 
for more than a quarter century. On the other hand, public officials
in post-war Japan have accepted the legitimacy of party government and 
4are ready to accede to party politicians' views, when the latter 
express an explicit policy preference. Moreover, public officials 
tend to refrain from becoming involved in controversial issues, which 
might damage their career opportunities. As a result, the LDP's in­
fluence prevails on ideological issues. As for budget making, the 
Prime Minister and the Finance Minister (both are party leaders) as­
sume the responsibility for integrating the party's preferences and 
making the final decision on controversial items.
This paper will apply the above arguments in an attempt to analyze 
the budget-making process for fiscal 1981, with a focus on defense 
expenditures, and to evaluate the party's role and its influence vis- 
a-vis the various burearcracies in the Japanese political system.
II. THE MAKING OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981
Appendix A presents data on Japanese defense spending since 1970, 
both in absolute amounts and as a fraction of total government spend­
ing and GNP. In 1980, after a heated debate within the government and 
the party in power during the budget compilation process, the Japanese 
government decided to increase defense spending for fiscal 1981 by 7.61 
percent over that of the previous year. This figure was lower than the 
9.7 percent raise requested by the Defense Agency. The U.S. govern­
ment had also made it clear that it regarded a 9.7 percent increase in 
Japanese defense appropriations as the minimum. Thus, the Agency and 
the U.S. government were both unhappy with this decision. However, 
it was considerably higher than the 4.3 percent increase in appropri­
ations for general expenditures in the budget. The Japan Socialist 
5Party and the Japan Communist Party charged that the government was 
giving "priority" to defense at a time when the administration was 
cutting down on social spending in order to contain budget deficits. 
They also charged that the government had embarked on a course that 
would make Japan a large, expansionist military power.
Japanese newspapers, which are usually critical of any defense 
build-up, gave two contradictory assessments of the 7.61 figure. One 
article accused the government of giving preferential treatment 
to the defense budget. It indicated that the budget was extremely 
tight as a whole, with the lowest increase since 1958. A 7.61 per­
cent increase for defense was greater than that for most other cate­
gories, social security expenditure (7.60 percent) in particular. 
Another article in the same paper gave the government credit for mak­
ing a more than two percent cut in the 9.7 percent increase requested 
by the Defense Agency, thus resisting strong American pressure and the 
"rightward shift" in the Japanese political climate during 1980.
These contradictory evaluations stem not only from differences 
in policy preferences, but also from differences in the perspective 
from which one views the budget process. When one views the 7.61 
percent increase from a broad perspective (that is, in the context 
of the rightward shift in Japanese politics in the late seventies and 
the "Second Cold War" following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), 
it is not unreasonable to view the increase as the fruition of 
persistent efforts by right-wing groups to force an increase in the 
level of defense spending, which had stagnated during the seventies. 
On the other hand, when one focuses upon the budget process itself. 
6beginning in August 1980, it could very well be argued that the 9.7 
percent raise, virtually promised to the United States in June 1980 
by the late Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi, was trimmed back to the 
seven percent range by rising domestic criticism. First, I would 
like to look at the issue in the wider perspective and examine the 
making of the defense budget for fiscal 1981 in that context.
By the summer of 1980, a number of factors had emerged that lent 
weight to the agrument for an increase in the defense budget. Above 
all, the marked increase of Soviet naval forces in the Western Paci­
fic and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided hawks with an 
excellent justification for their arguments for building a larger de­
fense capacity. The growing pressure from the U.S. government to in­
crease the Japanese defense budget was felt by all policy-making 
elites in Japan. These factors contributed to the "preferential treat­
ment" given to defense at the budget request stage in late July, in 
spite of the Finance Ministry's policy of reducing the budget in order 
to rebuild deficit-ridden state finances. Thus, The Japan Times wrote 
on July 30:
The Finance Ministry has decided to severely scrutinize budget 
appropriations in fiscal 1981, beginning next April,in order 
to cut swollen fiscal deficits and thus apply a low ceiling 
on budgetary requests. The ministry policy will bind other 
ministries and agencies, excepting those such as the Defense 
Agency, to strictly observe the 7.9 percent increase guide­
line in preparing their budgetary requests for the fiscal 
year...
Defense Agency Director General Joji Omura Monday won Finance
Minister Michio Watanabe's agreement to increase defense 
spending in fiscal 1981 by 9.7 percent. Watanabe agreed to 
exempt fiscal 1981 defense spending from the 7.9 percent 
guideline in view of the growing pressure from the United 
States to increase the defense budget. 4
7Until the mid-seventies, the LDP government, under the leader­
ship of successive Defense Agency Director Generals recruited from 
among LDP moderates, restrained and slowed down its defense build­
up program. This policy was primarily due to two factors: inter­
national detente, symbolized by the Soviet-American and Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement as well as SALT I, and the domestic financial crisis 
that followed the first oil crisis. The Fourth Defense Build-Up 
Plan (1972-76), drafted by the Defense Agency under Director General 
Nakasone Yasuhiro, had to be scaled down substantially before it re­
ceived final cabinet approval. Furthermore, unlike the three pre­
vious five year defense plans, even this modest target could not 
be reached. Many programs were left out and the next long-term plan 
was not even drafted.
Under the dovish Miki administration (1974-76), Defense Agency 
Director General Sakata Michita gave positive meaning to this slow 
down, linking it to detente. When he assumed office,
"the budget outlook was unpromising, and the price of 
weapons was rising rapidly... Mr. Sakata saw no like­
lihood of substantially improving the Defense Force's 
weapons and equipment... Consequently, instead of clam­
oring for budget increases and legitimacy for the De­
fense Agency and the Self Defense Forces, Minister 
Sakata directed the Defense Bureau to prepare a White 
Paper that would reassure the Opposition and the doves 
—a White Paper free of the hawkish arguements that 
characterized previous Defense Agency publications. 5
In addition, he launched a series of public relations activities to 
gain public support and greater legitimacy for the SDF. At the same 
time, he formulated a new concept known as "the basic standing force" 
to justify his scaling down of defense programs on the basis of a
new strategic doctrine. It assumed that detente would continue for 
8at least ten years. In this context, the cabinet made a formal de­
cision in November 1976 to keep annual defense spending under one 
percent of GNP for the time being.
It should be noted, however, that Sakata also initiated an im­
portant innovative policy, which broke a taboo in Japanese politics 
and antagonized the opposition parties. What Sakata wanted to do 
was to lay the groundwork for joint operations between American armed 
forces and Japan's Self Defense Forces to take place in times of 
emergency. Sakata's proposal was partly the result of the scaling 
down of the Japanese defense capacity, which necessitated closer 
ties with, and a larger dependency upon, the American military. At 
a meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in August 1975, 
Sakata proposed that a bi-lateral committee be established to examine 
problems related to the conduct of joint operations. An agreement 
made at this meeting set the opening of negotiations for a series of 
proposed joint excercises to be conducted in the late seventies.
Director General Kanemaru Shin of the Fukuda administration con­
tinued Sakata's policy and appealed to the public more openly, em­
phasizing the necessity of an increased defense preparedness. The 
debate on revising the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution 
was revived with the purpose of giving a more unambiguous legitimacy 
to the Self Defense Forces. Resistance of the opposition parties 
to the "rightward shift" remained weak through the late seventies, 
and Sakata's efforts proved to have contributed to the favorable condi­
tions that led to the gradual increase in defense capacity.
The December 1979 Soviet invation of Afghanistan precipitated 
this trend to the right within the LDP. That following June, the
9LDP won a landslide victory in the general election. Although the 
victory was not attributable to the international situation nor the 
appeal of the above hawkish positions, the party gained increased 
freedom of action in the Diet. On the other hand, the American 
government began to urge that Japan accept a larger role in the 
defense of the West and pressured specifically for an increase in the 
1981 defense budget. The U.S. Congress also denounced Japan for 
enjoying a free ride on defense. Unresolved economic issues be­
tween the two countries tended to get twisted in with the security 
issue. As a result, support for increased defense spending gained 
momentum even among those Japanese political elites who did not be­
lieve in the seriousness of the Soviet threat. It was felt that 
in order to soften American pressure on trade issues, Japan had to 
increase its defense appropriations. That is, even though they were 
somewhat skeptical of America's interpretation of the international 
situation, Japanese political elites were ready to accede to the 
American defense request in order to maintain good relations with 
the United States. This opinion was widely held, not only in the 
LDP and the Defense Agency, but in the Foreign Ministry, MITI, and 
the business community as well.
In this political climate, the Defense Agency was allowed in 
late July 1980 to request a 9.7 percent increase for fiscal 1981. 
While all other government ministries were instructed to hold their 
initial budgetary request within a 7.5 percent increase (this prac­
tice is called "ceiling"), the Defense Agency was made an exception.
Thus, the Agency requested expenditures of 2.4 trillion yen, exact­
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ly 9.7 percent above the fiscal 1980 allocation. When extra funds 
for an inflationary adjustment on personnel expenditures were add­
ed, the defense budget increase was expected to be about 12 per­
cent. Moreover, Finance Minister Watanabe responded favorably, al­
though vaguely, to a further request for funds to cover "situational 
changes".
In retrospect, the agreement on the request ceiling proved to 
be critical for the final decision of the 7.61 percent raise, for 
the ceiling became the framework within which later political con­
flicts evolved. In other words, the political process which follow­
ed was a "fine tuning" of figures under the ceiling. It seems, how­
ever, that the Agency was not well aware of the significance of the 
ceiling decision. Due to this cognitive failure, the Agency com­
mitted two tactical errors. First, it remained ambiguous at this 
stage as to whether the 9.7 percent included the extra funds need­
ed for the inflationary adjustment for personnel expenditures. (The 
adjustment is usually two or three percent.) The top government 
leaders deliberately kept this point vague in order to retain 
maneuverability in the later stages. The Agency began regularly- 
scheduled budget negotiations with the Finance Ministry without 
clarifying this point in advance. As will be pointed out shortly, 
the hawkish consensus quickly broke down when the budget-making 
process moved into full swing, because at this time policy groups 
began to compete with each other for favorite programs. Therefore, 
the only time the Defense Agency could have excluded annual person­
nel pay raises from the 9.7 percent was when the agreement on the 
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ceiling was being made. However, the Agency missed this opportu­
nity, and ultimately lost its battle with the Finance Ministry over 
this issue. Thus, the defense budget increase would be held to 
a maximum of 9.7 percent, which included the estimated 2.2 percent 
raise in personnel pay. This wa$, of course, contrary to the under­
standing with the United States.
Secondly, the Agency did not make another request. The initial 
request was exactly that of the established ceiling. It was ex­
pected that the Finance Ministry would trim back the request some­
what, and that it was impossible to get a 9.7 percent increase with­
out requesting more than that amount.
To begin with, the Foreign Ministry and pro-defense Diet members 
expressed their discontent with the Agency for the latter's ready 
acceptance of the 9.7 percent increase ceiling in the summer. This 
passive attitude of the Agency was in part attributable to the fact 
that its top positions, including the Accounting Division Director, 
were mostly occupied by people who had been temporarily transfered 
from the Finance Ministry. They thus tended to sympathize with 
the Finance Ministry's desire to reduce the size of the budget. In 
addition, Defense Agency officials are by tradition overly-sensitive 
to public criticism, which hindered them from taking advantage of 
changes in the political atmosphere. By requesting an amount with­
in the ceiling, they abandoned their aim of attaining the 9.7 per­
cent increase.
Thus, by the summer of 1980, it was practically decided that
the defense budget increase would fall within the 7 and 8 percent 
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range. The budget-making process thereafter revolved around the 
question of how the Finance Ministry and dovish LDP politicians, 
supported by public opinion, would trim its size, and how the 
Defense Agency and pro-defense Diet members would resist. In the 
following section, I will examine this process by focusing upon 
intra-party groups.
III. INTRA-PARTY POLITICS
Among the intra-party groups favoring a larger defense budget 
was one commonly called the "Kokubozoku" (Defense Tribe) or "Kokubo 
Giin" (Defense Dietmen), which attracted the most attention because 
of its highly visible activities. The members of this group are 
leading members of the Defense Division and the Investigative Com­
mission on National Security, organized within the Policy Affairs 
Research Council, the most important party organization for policy 
making. These Dietmen, displaying an unusual intensity, utilized 
both formal and informal channels in trying to influence the lead­
ers of the LDP, the Cabinet, and the Finance Ministry on the defense 
spending issue. For example, they frequently held joint sessions 
of the LDP's committee on defense, including the Special Committee 
on Military Base Problem, inviting either the Defense Agency's 
Director General or Vice Director to attend. More frequent were 
the series of joint sessions held by their chairmen and vice chair­
men. In these sessions, they often made resolutions, stressing that 
the 9.7 percent raise was a minimum demand. With these resolutions
in hand, they repeatedly visited the Prime Minister, the Director 
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of Cabinet Secretariat, the Party "Big Three", as well as the 
Finance Minister. At the same time, they summoned the Director 
of the Budget Bureau and/or the concerned Examiner of the Finance 
Ministry to "explain" their demand and to press for more expendi­
tures for defense.
On December 24 1980, during the final phase of budget-making, 
more than twenty-five Diet members converged on the office of Cabinet 
Secretariat Director Miyazawa Kiichi and besieged him for an hour 
with sharp questions and demands. Pressure of this sort is quite 
common in Japanese budget politics. As John Campbell has written, 
"the most common characterization of the (LDP's) division is a 
'cheering section', sitting on the sidelines and applauding each 
move of its ministry as it battles with the MOF."^ But Defense 
Dietmen had never so actively pursued these tactics as they did in 
1980.
In spite of these conspicuous activities, however, they were not 
able to influence the final outcome. There were three reasons for 
this. First, none of the pro-defense Dietmen were influential party 
leaders, and the "Defense Tribe" was lacking in skillful and force­
ful leadership. Second, the Defense Agency and Defense Dietmen did 
not have the backing of such outside groups as industrial associations 
or local constituent groups. Third, they did not gain the support 
of any leading faction leaders. Let us examine these points more 
closely.
The leading members of the LDP's committees on defense were,
among others, Genda Minoru (Chairman of the Defense Division), 
14
Arita Motoharu (Deputy Chairman), Mihara Asao (Chairman of the 
Investigative Commission on National Security), and Minowa Noboru 
(Deputy Chairman). They took active leadership roles in the 1980 
petitioning. None of them, with the possible exception of Mihara, 
were powerful members of the LDP, however, nor did they enjoy easy 
access to the LDP leadership. Genda, the most active of the four 
men, had been concerned strictly with defense for many years, and 
tended to be isolated because of his extremely hawkish ideology and 
his rather arrogant personality. (He is an ex-servicemen with combat 
experience in World War II. He also served in the Self Defense Air 
Force.) With his technical expertise and unusual enthusiasm, he was 
regarded as the leader of the "Defense Tribe". He lacked, however, 
a leadership position within the LDP, where practical compromise 
and financial power are respected and necessary.
Their lack of access to the top LDP leadership was borne out 
when the top leaders decided once and for all to trim the defense 
budget increase back to the seven percent level. They had difficulty 
persuading the Defense Dietmen to "take down the flag". Even after 
the Director General and other officials of the Defense Agency ac­
cepted compromise at the final stage, these supporters continued to 
call for the original traget. Finally, Ex-Director General Mihara, 
one of the leading Defense Dietmen, was given the task by the LDP 
leaders of convincing the others to accept the compromise settlement. 
He was the only person who could serve as a "pipeline" between the 
top leaders and Defense Dietmen. The lack of harmonious communica­
tion and understanding between these two groups made his a particular­
ly difficult task.
15
There was another factor which prevented the effective influence 
of these Defense Dietmen. In addition to their defense lobbying, 
most of them had to devote their efforts to promote other budget­
ary programs that appealed to their constituents. For example, 
most Defense Dietmen are backed by veterans and war-bereavement 
associations. The Finance Minister could, and did, threaten them 
by suggesting that an increase in defense spending would lead to re­
duction in veterans' and war-widows' benefits.
In addition to the above Defense Dietmen who devoted most of 
their energies to the defense budget, there were a few influential 
LDP politicians who were sympathetic to the requests of the Defense 
Agency. Typically, they had become familiar with defense issues 
while serving as the Director General of the Defense Agency at one 
time or another. They were, for the most part, senior LDP members, 
and had acquired practical bargaining skills. They were, among others, 
Kanemaru Shin, Sakata Michita, and Hosoda Kichizo. (Mihara can also 
be regarded as part of this group.) These Dietmen were mostly second- 
ranking members in the party hierarchy and hence could have contri­
buted more effectively to the realization of a larger defense budget 
than the above mentioned Defense Dietmen. However, they were too 
preoccupied promoting the programs of other ministries to devote 
much of their time and resources to the defense budget. For example, 
Kanemaru was head of the "Highway Construction Tribe", while Sakata, 
as a leading member of the "Education Tribe", was involved in the 
education budget.
More importantly, however, they contrasted with "mainstream 
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Defense Dietmen who argued single-mindedly for a larger defense 
budget, by being ideologically moderate and more sensitive to public 
opposition. When these individuals held the office of Agency Director 
General, each had made strenuous efforts, through vigorous public 
relations campaigns, to make the Self Defense Force more acceptable 
to the general public, sometimes even at the expense of a larger 
defense buildup. Although these Dietmen were deeply concerned with 
the problems faced by the Agency and generally sympathetic to the 
Agency's requests, they held independent judgements on what defense 
policies should be. In short, they were not mere "cheering enthu­
siasts" of the Agency. Their long record in party politics, com­
bined with actual experience in defense administration, made their 
arguments seem sophisticated and convincing, at least to the top LDP 
leadership. Thus, their influence was often critical. Sakata, for 
example, worried that a too-rapid increase in defense spending would 
undermine those positive images of the Self Defense Forces that had 
been cultivated with the public, and could easily stimulate anti­
military sentiments. He therefore opposed the large increases re­
quested by the Agency in 1980. It seems that his argument was taken 
seriously by Prime Minister Suzuki and was reflected in the final 
governmental draft for the 1980 budget.
Meanwhile, the LDP's Investigative Commission on Foreign Policy 
and the Foreign Ministry, which had at first eagerly supported the 
Defense Agency's request out of their own concern over Japan's de­
teriorating relations with the United States, came to be preoccupied 
with their own programs, which included the Official Development
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Assistance Program. As a result, their support of the Agency dis­
solved, once the budget-making process moved into full swing. Be­
cause the budget-making process was concentrated into a few months, 
the Agency was unable to overcome its isolation vis-a-vis the power­
ful Finance Ministry. In other words, the hawkish consensus within 
the LDP, created in the spring and summer, did not materialize into 
an effective force to influence the budget. It remained a "silent 
majority".
More fundamentally, however, the limits of the Defense Dietmen's 
impact stemmed largely from the fact that they did not enjoy power­
ful sponsoring groups. The Japanese defense industry and its unions 
did not have established, powerful lobbying groups to levy political 
pressure. The Dietmen's pressure was primarily based upon a "philos­
ophical argument", rather than the weight of "interest". In this 
sense, their demand was unique, for in the LDP most Dietmen repre­
sent certain sectional interests. A Finance Ministry official, when 
interviewed, said that Dietmen never intervene specifically to 
sponsor a particular procurement project or to back a defense cor­
poration, at least at the budget-making stage. Lobbying efforts 
are directed exclusively towards the total amount of the defense 
budget. This contrasts sharply with the "Highway Construction Tribe" 
and the "Education Tribe", who lobby for their electoral districts 
or for their sponsoring companies, as well as for increases in the 
total budget. Other evidence also backs this observation. If this 
indeed is true, then defense budgeting is not involved in regular
LDP patronage politics. This is partly due to the fact that the 
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selection of specific armaments and the resulting contracts are 
established during the process of making the long-term (usually 
five year) defense buildup plan. But there are more important 
structural factors.
First, the Japanese defense industry has not grown large enough 
to affect the economic stability and employment opportunity in any 
particular district, not to mention the Japanese economy as a whole. 
It constitutes only a maximum of 0.3 to 0.4 percent of the total 
national industrial output. The Finance Ministry has long been 
deeply concerned with the potential problems of military industry, 
and has made conscious efforts to prevent a "military-industrial 
complex" from emerging in Japan. The MOF has rejected repeated re­
quests from MITI and the Defense Agency to develop the Japanese arms 
industry. The banking community has also been negative towards 
the defense industry because of its fluctuating demand structure, 
and has abstained from investing funds in arms. Without the finan­
cial backing of the government and the banks, the Japanese defense 
industry could not expand, or even survive. The government, includ­
ing the Defense Agency prior to 1970, has mostly preferred to import 
less expensive American weapons rather than embark upon costly 
domestic research and development ventures. This has resulted in 
a poorly developed Japanese defense industry.7 Hence, few Dietmen, 
if any, have an electoral district with a large armament industry. 
Unlike their American counterparts, Defense Dietmen in Japan are 
not connected to defense corporations and related unions in their
home districts. This is reflected in their "philosophical approach
19
to the defense budget.
It is sometimes pointed out that the recent hawkish positions 
taken by Democratic Socialist Party members reflect their representa­
tion of defense sector labor union interests. In my view, this state­
ment is rather exaggerated, although it is undeniable that a few 
labor unions in the defense sector lobby for the defense industry 
through the DSP. In any case, Defense Dietmen in the LDP do not 
appear to be under pressure from their constituencies.
Secondly, as the Lockheed scandal revealed, the LDP faction 
leaders are heavily involved in the clandestine selection of air­
craft, with each party boss being supported by a particular American 
aircraft corporation and its representative in Japan. (Except for 
aircraft, bribery is rare in Japanese defense procurement. Most 
decisions are made in an institutionalized way, which makes it dif­
ficult for a single politician or senior bureaucrat to influence the 
outcome. During the 1950's, competition among the armament industries, 
with the exception of aerospace, was minimized through MITI's ad­
ministrative guidance, and new entry has been strictly controlled.) 
As far as we know, the corruption extended only to the question of 
choosing a company rather than the larger issue of whether or not 
to increase the size of the defense budget. In other words, the 
defense industry as a group has not lobbied seriously for a larger 
defense budget, although industrial associations periodically submit 
such requests to the government. Evidence cannot be found to support
the argument that the defense industry put pressure directly on the 
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Finance Ministry or government and party leaders during the fiscal 
1981 budget making. True, such a conclusion must be tentative be­
cause of the nature of the channels of influence. But it is un­
deniable that the industry's influence was insufficient to overcome 
the reluctance of the top government leaders to increase the defense 
budget.
Defense issues, like foreign policy issues, are unpopular with 
the ordinary Dietman, because they do not help him cultivate elec­
toral support at the constituent level. If he is too preoccupied 
with defense issues to care for his constituency, he is likely to 
lose his reelection bid. This had actually happened to a consider­
able number of Dietmen, the most notable example being Hoshina 
Zenshiro, the top leader of the "Defense Tribe" in the sixties. 
Hence, the Defense Agency has enjoyed only a limited support, at 
best, from ordinary Dietmen.
To summarize, the pressure for a larger defense budget simply 
reflected the rightward ideological shift within the LDP and was 
not deeply tied to the basic power structure of the party, namely 
the politics of money and patronage. In interest politics, the 
role of ideology is greatly diminished. Therefore, conservative 
politicians did not need to rely upon hawkish appeal to mobilize 
voters. They had a safer method, the patronage of sponsoring com­
panies and the granting of favors to voters. The politics of in­
terest have prevented, or at least slowed down, a new cold war 
ideology (in terms of a Soviet military threat) from penetrating 
the masses. This accounts for the weak influence of Japanese
21
Defense Dietmen. They were not in the mainstream of Japanese poli­
tics .
The responses of faction leaders to the defense budget was 
another critical factor. The attitude of the Fukuda faction was 
the most critical, because Fukuda Takeo, Ex-Prime Minister, and 
his junior partner Abe Shintaro had expressed sympathy for the 
hawks. Had they wanted to, they could have reversed the decision 
in favor of the Defense Agency. Fukuda's support was indispensable 
to the stability of the Suzuki administration while Abe was one of 
the Party "Big Three", the Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research 
Council, which is one of the most critical positions for aggrega­
ting party budget demands.
Coalitions between policy groups and factions were by no means 
rare in the 1980 budget formation process. For example, the "Postal 
Service Tribe" and the Tanaka faction joined forces to pressure the 
government to establish the Postal Voluntary Pension Fund. Diet 
members connected to the Postal Service demanded it openly, while
8 
the Tanaka faction wielded influence behind the scenes. A similar 
coalition was made in opposition to the Finance Ministry's plan to 
discontinue the provision of free textbooks to public school pupils. 
"The Education Tribe" approached the Fukuda faction in order to gain 
its support on this issue. The "Defense Tribe" could have made a 
similar alliance with the Fukuda faction.
In fact, many members of the Fukuda faction, together with those 
of the Nakagawa faction (another hawkish faction), stormed into a
joint session of the LDP's committees on defense on December 23. 
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They expressed their firm support of the Agency's requests. They 
were deeply disturbed by the ongoing budgetary negotiations and 
afraid that Suzuki's policy would prevail unless they did not help 
the Defense Agency. This sort of pressure was quite disturbing, 
particularly at this final stage of budget making. It could have 
turned the final hectic moments of budget negotiations into chaos, 
and driven the Suzuki Cabinet, which was administratively responsible 
for the smooth compilation of the budget, into a corner. As a re­
sult, the government leaders used various channels to approach Dir­
ector General Ohmura and pressed him to moderate the Agency's demands.
As this episode suggests, a move by the Fukuda faction could 
have easily led to a power struggle, crossing beyond normal policy 
conflicts. Since summer, the defense budget had attracted great at­
tention within the LDP, and the Prime Minister regarded it as a 
most important item, to be decided at the top. If Fukuda wanted to 
intervene, he had to be prepared for a possible change in party 
leadership, or worse, a split in the LDP. This made him cautious 
and restrained. The Suzuki faction, in turn, had to suppress, at 
all costs, the demands for a larger defense budget issued through 
factional channels. It was due to this sort of factional considera­
tion that Ex-Director General Kanemaru, a leading member of the 
Tanaka faction (one of the mainstream factions), kept silent through­
out December, in spite of his sympathy for larger defense expendi­
tures. Kikaido Susumu, another leading member of the Tanaka fac­
tion and one of the Party "Big Three" (Executive Council Chairman),
showed a similar attitude throughout the 1981 budget compilation 
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process. Thus, serious restraints were imposed after December 10, 
when Prime Minister Suzuki made his position clear to the party. 
Open challenges could not be made thereafter.
The above analysis clearly indicates that budget making is 
regarded as an important administrative responsibility, which is 
supposed to be discharged smoothly by the Cabinet and hence by the 
mainstream faction. Its time schedule is fairly constrained. Any 
disruption would pose a serious challenge to the administration. 
As a result, party leaders rely upon party discipline to settle con­
troversial items in order to meet the deadline. This results in a 
conservative tendency in budget making. It was therefore necessary 
for Director General Ohmura and Vice Director Hara, both senior 
members of the administration, to persuade Defense Dietmen to ac­
cept the cuts at this final budget-making stage. Another modera­
ting factor was the incrementalism which is inherent to budget 
making. Incrementalism tends to maintain the status quo by mili­
tating against substantial raises as well as against substantial cuts. 
For example, although pro-welfare Diet members were in a less favor­
able position than their pro-defense counterparts, they were able to 
gain an increase in social security expenditures due to this principle.
Incrementation in budgeting is a common phenomenon found in any 
industrialized nation. In Japan's 1981 budget, the Defense Agency's 
demands were restrained directly by the Finance Ministry, and in­
directly by the other ministries and their supporters. Top government 
leaders and the Finance Ministry were afraid that if they accepted
the defense budget increase as requested, they would be unable to 
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force other ministries and their supporting groups in the LDP to 
moderate their demands. In fact, after seeing the Defense Dietmen 
receive "preferential treatment" for the defense budget in the 
summer, other LDP committees were encouraged and began pushing to 
have their budgets exempted from the restrictive guidelines as 
well. Party leaders were deeply disturbed by these moves which 
were stimulated by the "preferential treatment". They therefore 
tried to retreat from what seemed to be a clear cut priority given 
to defense. The top leaders belatedly realized that a dispropor- 
tionally high increase in defense spending would have serious im­
plications for the budgets in other sectors and for the budget pro­
cess as a whole.
The Finance Ministry wanted to impose unprecedented restraints 
on the total budget size for fiscal 1981. As a result, the zero­
sum relation between the defense and other budget categories was 
felt more keenly in 1980 than in any previous year. Thus, defense 
sympathizers who belonged to the other "Tribes" kept silent. Fur­
thermore, "Welfare Dietmen" launched a severe attack specifically 
against defense budget increases, an unusual practice in Japanese 
budget-making. Health and Welfare Minister Sonoda Sunao, a power­
ful LDP member, led the LDP's Social Division's criticism of the 
priority given to defense. He argued that social security expendi­
ture increase should be at least in balance with the defense budget. 
His argument was accepted by government leaders. Therefore, on 
December 11, Suzuki said that the defense’ buildup should be carried
out step by step, taking into consideration welfare, education and 
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other major expenditures, because a sudden increase in defense 
spending would create resistance.
IV. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
It is insufficient to explain the reduction of the defense 
budget raise solely by such negative factors as the lack of the 
Defense Dietmen's influence and incrementalism, for conscious ef­
forts were made by the top LDP leaders to scale it down. Ex-Prime 
Minister Ohira Masayoshi (1979-80) held to his "low posture" policy 
in international politics, and Suzuki, his immediate successor, at­
tempted to maintain the same stance. This policy was firmly root­
ed in the post-war Japanese tradition of economic rationalism, and 
had contributed to the great successes in economic development. 
Japanese political elites were deeply committed to this line and 
felt no need to abruptly change it. This thinking was a major factor 
in the different interpretations of Soviet intentions that arose
9 
between American and Japanese political elites.
However, more important in the context of this analysis was the 
fact that Japanese leaders felt constrained by possible public reaction. 
A detailed examination of the 1981 budget process clearly shows that 
Suzuki at first tried to avoid imposing his own preferences on 
defense. At least, he wanted to assume that posture. It was early 
December when he began to assert his leadership. A most critical 
decision was made on December 10, when Suzuki summoned top career 
officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency in order 
to unify opinion before his meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense
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Harold Brown. This was just before Brown's visit to Japan to demand 
from Suzuki a larger defense buildup. At this preparatory meeting 
with Suzuki, both officials urged that the 9.7 percent increase 
was indispensable to sustain the good will of the U.S. government. 
Suzuki reportedly admonished the officials, replying, "It is wrong 
to think that the failure to meet the American request will hurt the 
bond of trust between Japan and the United States." He then instruct­
ed them to trim back the defense budget request. On the following 
day, he told Brown that the 9.7 percent increase would be difficult, 
given present domestic conditions. He specifically explained the 
need to "balance" defense spending with appropriations for social 
welfare, education and other key programs within the framework of 
the budget austerity policy. He stressed the importance of gaining 
the understanding of the people.
A few days later, Suzuki discussed the content of his talks 
with Brown with other top government and party leaders. Echoing 
Sakata's argument, he reportedly said, "Recently, we have been 
witnessing the long-awaited elevation of defense consciousness among 
the Japanese people. Meanwhile, we are also encountering the diffi­
culty of trying to raise taxes to rebuild state finances. If we 
push too hard now, this favorable consciousness might recede... We 
cannot take the chance of increasing the defense budget dispropor- 
tionally, at the risk of inviting criticism and damaging the emerg­
ing consensus on defense."
After Suzuki made his intentions clear, the Party "Big Three"
individually expressed their support of Suzuki's decision. The 
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"public pledge" to the United States thus was made meaningless. 
The Japanese government had rejected the request by its "elder 
partner" in an unprecedentedly blunt way. Next, the Defense Agency 
altered its object to one in which it would replenish front line 
equipment under the limited budget, at the expense of personnel 
expenditures. The Agency wished to soothe possible American frus­
tration by incorporating, as much as possible, American proposals 
on specific defense buildup programs. Consequently, the coopera­
tive planning and operations that existed between the militaries of 
the two countries were promoted. Beyond this point, particularly 
after December 20, the Agency became increasingly annoyed with the 
Defense Dietmen's continued demands for the original target.
Suzuki justified his decision to the U.S. government and 
Japanese political elites in two ways. He argued for "balance" on 
the following grounds: First, he emphasized, "If defense were given 
prominent preferential treatment, opposition would grow among the 
people against the defense budget itself. The result would be the 
creation of obstacles to any long-run defense buildup." He used 
this justification at the meeting with Secretary Brown. He also 
tried to convince the Defense Dietmen by advising them to take a 
long range perspective. Secondly, he said, "A disproportionate in­
crease in the defense budget at the expense of direct services to 
the people, like social welfare, would create a negative popular 
reaction against a possible tax increase. It would endanger the re­
building of state finances, which is by itself an inherently diffi­
cult task." He emphasized this point to the business community as 
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well as to party leaders who were deeply concerned with the "fiscal 
crisis".
His arguments assumed that the rightward shift in public opinion 
had not gone far enough to make the people accept an "unbalanced" 
increase of the defense budget. (It seems that Suzuki judged that 
the people would not be opposed to a defense budget increase unless 
it was accompanied by a tax raise or by a reduction in welfare ex­
penditures.) As a professional party politician with a long career, 
he was confident of his own judgement. Furthermore, he believed 
that one of the most important missions of his administration was to 
rebuild state finances and solve the financial crisis. He was, and 
still is, a strong economic traditionalist. He believed that the 
national deficit was the most pressing problem and had to be solved 
quickly. In other words, his thinking was governed more by the 
approach of the Finance Ministry than that of the Defense Agency, 
the Foreign Ministry and the U.S. government, which insisted that 
defense was a much more urgent problem than finance. In the end, 
he was more concerned with domestic issues than international ones.
In any event, the reluctance of party leaders to implement an 
increase in defense spending stemmed from their concern over possible 
public reaction. Rank and file members of the LDP shared this 
opinion and concern. Regardless of individual feeling about the 
international situation and ideological orientations, LDP members 
shared a consensus over the voter's anticipated reaction to an un­
precedented increase in the defense budget.
In order to be reelected, every Dietman must maintain close
contacts with his constituents. He returns to his home district 
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every weekend even while the Diet is in session. In short, he is 
forced to be sensitive to public opinion. The top leaders, for 
their part, watch the changing tide of public opinion, which is 
reflected in local and national elections. The LDP politicians 
attributed the general election defeat of 1979 to Prime Minister 
Ohira's outspoken appeal for a tax raise to solve the financial 
crisis. The tax increase issue thereafter became a taboo topic 
during election campaigns. In 1980, many conservatives were afraid 
that the defense budget would become intertwined with the sensi­
tive taxation issue. The LDP's landslide victory in 1980, in their 
estimation, was due to the careful avoidance of this tax issue.
Moreover, at the same time, LDP leaders did not want to endan­
ger the fruits that had accrued from their long-term low posture ap­
proach to the defense budget, especially since it was felt that 
Director General Sakata had created positive popular attitudes 
towards the SDF. The party therefore showed a realistic (or oppor­
tunistic) appreciation of public opinion. They knew well that this 
sort of realism had contributed to the stable one-party system that 
had dominated Japan for more than twenty-five years.
Therefore, public opinion, through the law of anticipated 
reaction, kept defense increases in "balance" with other expenditures. 
The LDP played the role of translating public opinion into the budget­
ary process. Its influence was comparable to, if not greater than,
the budget control exercised by the "omnipotent" Finance Ministry.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Utilizing Theodore Lowi's three-fold classification of issue 
arenas.^ I will summarize the above arguments in terms of the LDP's 
influence on defense budget-making.
First, as far as defense procurement is concerned, the parti­
cularistic intervention of party politicians normally present in 
Japanese politics is not evident at the time of the budget process. 
This is due partly to the fact that armaments are selected at the 
time of the making of the long-range defense build-up plan. More 
fundamentally, however, the leading members of the defense-related 
committees in the LDP are not interested in, nor capable of, influenc­
ing specific decisions on procurement. Their only concern is to 
raise or restrain total defense expenditures. They are willing 
to leave specific defense procurement decisions to the Defense 
Agency. In this respect, they are ideologically rather than inter­
est oriented. One of the important reasons for this lack of particu­
laristic intervention is the poorly developed Japanese arms industry. 
Few Diet members, if any, have home districts with large armaments 
industries. Unlike the United States, "Defense Dietmen" are not tied 
to defense corporations and their unions. This explains their lack 
of concern for procurement, and also their weak position within the 
LDP, where power stems mostly from financial sources.
Second, it is undeniable that the influence of the pro-defense 
Diet members increased substantially during the 1970's at least
vis-a-vis the Defense Agency. In the late sixties, the leading members
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of the defense committees of the LDP were mostly ex-military 
officers ideologically and personally connected with the pre-war 
armed forces. Having been military leaders, their perspectives 
were narrow, and their attitudes often arrogant. Hence, they 
tended to be isolated within the LDP. During the seventies, several 
influential LDP Dietmen were appointed as the Defense Agency Direc­
tor General. (Director General is a ministerial rank.) After serv­
ing as the Director General for about one year, they were placed in 
leading positions in defense-related committees and corresponding 
"Discussion Groups" of the LDP. Although these new "Defense Dietmen" 
concurred with the older pro-defense Diet members in their sympathies 
for the Defense Agency and in their technical understanding of def­
ense problems, they were more moderate ideologically and were more 
sensitive to both mainstream LDP thinking and public opinion. Since 
these newcomers rank just below the leadership in the party hierarchy, 
they have played an active role in promoting defense policy, includ­
ing the gradual defense budget increases.
Meanwhile, in the mid-seventies, young Dietmen began to join 
the "Defense Tribe". Most of them were nationalistic and fervently 
anti-communist. However, they had not yet assumed governing res­
ponsibilities in the administration or in the party. In other words, 
they had not been fully socialized into the LDP. They tended to 
follow the leadership of the older pro-defense Dietmen. By 1979 
these three groups together had contributed to the gradual increases 
in the defense budget.
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On the other hand, in 1980, the "Defense Tribe" was split into 
two groups along the lines that have already been described.
One group was unrelenting in its demand that the original 9.7 per­
cent target be adopted, while the other tended to take other prob­
lems into consideration, which softened their position on defense 
spending. Although the former group constituted a majority of the 
pro-defense Dietmen, they were less powerful within the LDP, and 
their impact upon the defense budget was limited. Yet, it should 
be noted that the strong pressure exerted by these Diet members, 
though unsuccessful, was without precedent in the budget-making pro­
cess. Their activities left the impression among other LDP members 
that the "Defense Tribe" had significantly increased its power 
amidst the "rightward shift" in Japanese politics.
As for the second group, the attitudes of its members were more 
complex. Sakata, for example, was cautious about increasing the 
defense budget too rapidly because he feared that it might stimu­
late popular anti-militarism. He therefore cautioned the party not 
to enlarge the defense budget to the extent requested by the United 
States. Kanemaru was too busy with the construction budget. More­
over, he was restrained by factional considerations. He wanted to 
leave the decision to the Prime Minister. Hosoda, a senior member 
of the Fukuda faction, seemed to take a similar position. Thus, in 
1980, the influence of pro-defense Dietmen as a whole was rather 
limited.
Thirdly, and most important, the Prime Minister's opinion was
crucial in deciding defense expenditures for fiscal 1981. He made 
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clear his intention to reject American pressure and the Defense 
Agency's request just before Secretary Brown visited Japan. When 
the Prime Minister insists, no one can resist. Knowing this, Suzuki 
personally intervened in the defense bueget-making process, consider­
ing the problem too important to be left to bureaucrats. As was 
pointed out earlier, his intervention was motivated by a deep con­
cern over the reaction of the mass media and the public. Like 
other controversial issues, the decision was made by the top LDP 
leadership.
I have argued that as far as the making of the defense budget 
is concerned, the LDP's influence is more powerful than the popular 
view suggests, and that this influence increased substantially dur­
ing the seventies. It is noteworthy, however, that in 1980 LDP 
politicians were almost exclusively concerned with the total amount 
of defense expenditures, because it was given symbolic importance in 
Japanese politics. They left decisions on the specific content of 
the budget to the Defense Agency. The Defense Agency, in turn, 
mostly performed the function of restraining and "balancing" the 
requests made by the individual armed services. Herein lies the 
important limitation of party influence.
In any event, the party in power, not the bureaucracy, played 
the dominant role and wielded decisive influence in trimming the 
defense budget back to the 7.61 level of increase for fiscal 1981. 
(Japanese names in the test are written in Japanese order, family 
name first.)
APPENDIX A
Japanese Defense Spending 1970-1981, Annual Rates of 
Growth and as a Percent of Government Spending 
and Gross National Product
Defense Growth from Defense as
Outlays Previous a % of Gov't Defense as
Billion Yen Year, % Spending a % of GNP
1970 569.5 17.7 7.2 .8
1971 670.9 17.8 7.1 .8
1972 800.2 19.3 7.0 .9
1973 935.5 16.9 6.5 .9
1974 1093.0 16.8 6.4 .8
1975 1327.3 21.4 6.2 .8
1976 1512.4 13.9 6.2 .9
1977 1690.6 11.8 5.9 .9
1978 1901.0 12.4 5.5 .9
1979 2094.5 10.2 5.4 .9
1980 2230.2 6.5 5.2 .9
1981 2400.0 7.6 5.1 .9
Source: Japanese Defense Agency
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